Précis of Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value by Lopes, Dominic McIver
Précis of Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value 
Dominic McIver Lopes 
Until the middle of the last century, much work on value gave pride 
of place to aesthetic value. G. E. Moore named beauty alongside 
friendship as by far the two greatest intrinsic goods, and C. I. Lewis 
devoted much of his Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation to the 
place of the pursuit of beauty among the ends of life.  Yet, by the 
s, aesthetic value had largely disappeared from the agenda in 
philosophy. Maybe the moral shock of the second world war made it 
seem a diversion, or maybe the admonitions of the logical positivists 
made it seem intractable. Another conjecture spurs Being for Beauty. 
Aesthetic value has been oﬀ the agenda in philosophy in the sense 
that the party line, never defended, just taken for granted, is 
aesthetic hedonism, and aesthetic hedonism was only going to own 
a piece of the stage in value theory during the heyday of general 
value hedonism. Being for Beauty articulates and defends a new 
theory, the network theory of aesthetic value. In doing so, it aims to 
rekindle work on aesthetic value and to oﬀer some insight into value 
and practical reasons more generally. 
The main argument for the network theory is a limited, 
contrastive argument to the best explanation. The argument is 
limited because there is no consensus in philosophy on what needs 
explaining. Some explananda are therefore proposed, in the hope of 
generating a discussion of whether the list is correct and complete. 
Limited arguments are tentative about explananda. The argument is 
contrastive because a case is made only that the network theory is 
superior to aesthetic hedonism, which is the only competition for 
now. 
According to aesthetic hedonism, an aesthetic value is a property 
of an item that stands in constitutive relation to ﬁnally valuable 
experiences of those who correctly understand the item. Being vivid 
is an aesthetic value. The vividness of Cantor’s Diagonal Proof is 
 Moore , Lewis .
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identical to or grounded in some of its other properties, ones that 
merit or dispose or induce those who understand it to respond with 
pleasure. Throughout the book, ﬁnally valuable experiences are 
called “pleasures,” with the understanding that pleasures are 
intellectual as well as sensory or aﬀective.  
Arguments bring out what is at stake in a position, so the lack of 
arguments for aesthetic hedonism is a problem for it. In the 
circumstances, Being for Beauty reads contemporary strands of 
aesthetic hedonism against a background of general commitments 
that it shares as common ground with the network theory.  
First is a distinction between aesthetic value and artistic value. 
Aesthetic value is found in works of art but also in nature, design, 
games and sports, religion, and the world of ideas. In addition, many 
artistic values are not aesthetic – they are moral, political, cognitive 
or practical instead. Nowadays, too many philosophers who 
acknowledge these points still use “artistic” and “aesthetic” 
interchangeably, and still gravitate to works of art for examples. 
Aesthetics must make sense of all sides of aesthetic life. 
Second, a theory of aesthetic value might answer two questions. 
A proof ’s vividness is an aesthetic value, but not a journalist’s 
integrity or an activist’s courage. The demarcation question asks 
what makes some values distinctively aesthetic.  However, knowing 
what makes the proof ’s vividness an aesthetic value leaves open what 
makes it the case that its being vivid gives anyone reason to do 
anything. The normative question asks what makes it the case that 
an item’s aesthetic value gives anyone reason to do anything. Only 
the normative question is addressed by the network theory and 
contemporary versions of aesthetic hedonism. Both punt on 
demarcation. To operationalize punting on demarcation, Being for 
 Stecker  misreads the book as attributing to aesthetic 
hedonists a narrow view of pleasure.
 In the book, the demarcation question is called the “aesthetic 
question.”
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Beauty adopts a working conception: a value is aesthetic when it is a 
paradigm aesthetic value. The idea is to stick with uncontroversial 
cases for the time being. 
Third, the network theory and aesthetic hedonism answer the 
normative question in a way that is at home in the standard 
framework for thinking about practical reasons. Aesthetic reasons 
are worldly facts, such as the fact that the proof is vivid. Facts such 
as these are empirical or theoretical reasons, but they are also 
practical reasons. They lend weight to the proposition that A should 
φ in C. Thus the fact that the proof is vivid lends weight to the 
proposition that Aisha should appreciate it in some circumstances. 
What explains her actually appreciating it is that she evaluates it as 
vivid. Her evaluating it as vivid is a motivating reason. Aesthetic acts 
are ones motivated by aesthetic evaluations. The book captures all 
this common ground in three framing assumptions:  
EVALUATION: a state is an aesthetic evaluation = the state is a 
mental representation of some item as having some aesthetic 
value.  
ACT: A’s φing is an aesthetic act = A’s φing counterfactually 
depends on the content of A’s aesthetic evaluation of x, where A’s 
φing operates on x.  
REASON: the fact that x is V is an aesthetic reason for A to φ in C 
= the fact that x is V lends weight to the proposition that A 
aesthetically should φ in C.  
To answer the normative question is to give an informative 
reduction of the right hand side of REASON, one that completes the 
schema: 
an aesthetic value, V, is reason-giving = the fact that x is V lends 
weight to the proposition that…  
Aesthetic hedonism naturally ﬁlls in the dots. Since being vivid 
stands in constitutive relation to pleasure, it lends weight to the 
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proposition that Aisha should appreciate it in C. Appreciating the 
proof delivers the pleasure, and anyone always has (maybe not 
decisive) reason to do what delivers pleasure. Aesthetic hedonists 
nowadays answer the normative question by appeal to plain vanilla 
hedonic normativity. 
Finally, to some explananda. Being for Beauty opens with case 
studies of several aesthetic experts, who perform reliably well, 
solving problems through their aesthetic activities. They are a 
gardener and her grandson, who restored the garden to life, a 
photographer who promoted the work of her predecessor, a talk 
show host who started a book club (you can guess), a video game 
source code sleuth, and a dance educator. Six observations about 
these cases need explaining. Aesthetic experts hail from almost all 
demographic niches, they jointly cover the whole aesthetic universe, 
they specialize by aesthetic domain (gardens vs photography), they 
specialize by activity (restoring vs promoting), where specialization 
by activity and domain interact (restoring gardens vs restoring 
games; making photographs vs promoting photographs); and their 
expertise is relatively stable.  
Philosophers working in aesthetics will be surprised by the case 
studies and the explananda. The prevalent image of the aesthetic 
expert is a consummate appreciator and critic, a Bernard Berenson 
or an F. R. Leavis. The demographics of the prevalent image are 
terrible, and it stems from two errors. One is to confuse aesthetic 
evaluation with aesthetic appreciation. Beginner mathematicians 
might judge, based on testimony, that the Diagonal Proof is vivid 
and yet be unable to appreciate it. Confusing aesthetic evaluation 
with aesthetic appreciation occasions a second error, which takes all 
aesthetic acts to be or to involve acts of appreciation. In truth, a 
source code sleuth needs to evaluate the game she’s working on, 
 Stecker  oﬀers a seventh, that “human beings appear to 
have always pursued aesthetic value going back to prehistory.” This 
fact is encompassed in the ﬁrst explanandum and is speciﬁcally 
leveraged in chapter .
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typically without playing the game. Although aesthetic hedonism 
encourages both errors, it commits to neither. So, the book assumes 
as common ground a distinction between appreciation and 
evaluation and the wide view of aesthetic acts that the distinction 
opens up. 
Whereas the best versions of aesthetic hedonism are consistent 
with most of the explananda, the network theory predicts all six. 
Here is the oﬃcial statement: 
an aesthetic value, V, is reason-giving = the fact that x is V lends 
weight to the proposition that it would be an aesthetic 
achievement for some A to φ in C, where x is an item in an 
aesthetic practice, K, and A’s competence to φ is aligned upon an 
aesthetic proﬁle that is constitutive of K.  
Commentators remark that the theory packs in many moving parts! 
Start with achievement. To achieve is to perform an act successfully, 
as a result of competence.  Right there we have the key ingredient of 
an answer to the normative question. Anyone who acts at all thereby 
has reason to succeed and to use their competence to succeed. So, if 
the fact that a proof is vivid lends weight to its being an achievement 
for Aisha to appreciate it, she has reason thereby to appreciate it. The 
network theory answers the normative question by appeal to plain 
vanilla practical normativity. 
Obviously, the ﬁrst clause of the reduction does not predict the 
explananda; the task is to show how the achievement clause 
generates the rest of the theory. As we saw, there are many types of 
aesthetic act – editing and restoring, not just appreciating. Each act-
type has characteristic success conditions and exploits diﬀerent 
skills. Suppose you take and promote photographs. You have 
diﬀerent aims and must bring diﬀerent skills to bear. Your having 
reason to achieve as a photographer and as a promoter is thereby 
reason for you to take photographs of a kind that you can promote 
 This minimal achievement. Other, more involved, phenomena 
are also described as achievements. See Bradford .
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and to promote in a way that ﬁts the photographs you take. Since 
that is demanding, you have achievement-based reason to specialize 
in one activity and ﬁnd a partner who specializes in the other. For 
that to work, you and your partner must be on the same page 
aesthetically. You must agree on the aesthetic proﬁle of the 
photographs (modernist, not pictorialist, for example). Indeed, you 
must be so coordinated around the same aesthetic proﬁle that your 
joint activities are explained by appeal to a norm to comply in a 
relatively stable way with the aesthetic proﬁle. You are now in a 
social practice wherein your reason to achieve is often enough 
reason to comply with the norm. Finally, your reason to achieve in 
this way drives more specialization. The practice comes to be 
populated by agents with many diﬀerent kinds of expertise. They 
specialize by reﬁning the aesthetic proﬁle, which leads to more 
specialized aesthetic domains – the proﬁle of photographs splits into 
pictorialist versus modernist, modernism splits into the mode of the 
decisive moment versus that of revealing formalism, and so on. 
Members of any social group, interacting non-aesthetically, will have 
reason to step onto the aesthetic specialization escalator. Plain 
vanilla practical normativity predicts the six explananda. 
The main argument for the network theory, namely that it 
handles the six explananda better than aesthetic hedonism, is meant 
to persuade, and also to enrich the pool of resources we have to 
think about aesthetic value. The distinction between demarcation 
and normativity, the application of the standard meta-normative 
framework, and the six explananda give us far more to work with 
than we ever had when we just took aesthetic hedonism for granted. 
In the same spirit, the ﬁnal chapters of the book oﬀer ﬁve bonus 
arguments for the network theory that empower thinking about 
aesthetic value.  
Chapter , on aesthetic motivation, takes the sting out of the 
implication that aesthetic value is not tied constitutively to pleasure. 
It also makes a case for aesthetic reasons externalism, the thesis that 
the fact that the proof is vivid is reason for Aisha to appreciate it 
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even if she cannot be motivated to appreciate it by her evaluating it 
as vivid. 
Certain worries about disagreement galvanize traditional 
thinking about aesthetic value.  Chapter  articulates the worries 
and dispels them by showing how they miss the key role that 
disagreement plays in smoothing aesthetic interaction by 
establishing, and also modifying, the proﬁles of aesthetic practices. 
Likewise, chapter  tackles the tradition’s worries about the 
response-dependence of aesthetic values. Distinguish two facts: 
. the proof is vivid 
. () is an aesthetic reason.  
The normative question asks what it is about vividness that makes 
() the case, and the network theory answers by reducing aesthetic 
normativity to plain vanilla practical normativity. But is () a 
response-dependent fact? No. The proof ’s vividness is grounded in 
its other features, not in features of us. Granted, the grounding 
comes with a social practice, and facts about us ground the fact that 
the practice is our practice. However, what we have is the fact that x 
is V is grounded in the fact that x is F, and, in addition, the fact that 
that whole fact (that the fact that x is V is grounded in the fact that x 
is F) is grounded by facts about us. From this it does not follow that 
facts about us ground the fact that x is V. 
Two closing chapters mull what draws us into aesthetics in the 
ﬁrst place. We want to know how engaging with beauty contributes 
to a life that goes well. Chapter  answers that achievement-based 
engagement in aesthetic practices sources meaning and well-being 
for individuals. Chapter  moves from the individual to the 
collective level, scouting the reasons we have to support aesthetic 
practices of which we are not members. Aesthetic goods are 
collective as well as personal goods. 
For centuries, philosophical attitudes to beauty have swung from 
overblown and even rapturous gloriﬁcation to neglect or suspicion. 
 See Kivy .
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Swings as wild as these cannot capture the truth about our aesthetic 
lives, where epiphanies and disasters are rare but where modest 
goods abound. The deepest commitment of Being for Beauty is to 
bracket the outliers and make sense of where the data points mass. 
We have an opportunity to get a better grip on values and reasons in 
general by studying one domain where values and their practical 
entanglements are concrete but also unencumbered by weighty 
authorities, the sting of reactive attitudes, and the pressure of 
emergencies. 
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